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The civil war in Lebanon is over. Sectarianism is not.
This simple observation should make all scholars who
analyse sectarianism (or communalism) pause and re-
flect on the nature of the problem that they are so
often called upon to explain. In Lebanon and else-
where Ð in India, Indonesia, the Philippines, and the
Balkans Ð religious violence and sectarian political dis-
course have not diminished in the modern world, and
in fact, in many instances have been exacerbated in it.
U n d e r s t a n d i n g
S e c t a r i a n i s m
The dominant paradigm to explain sectari-
anism has long insisted that modernity is
one thing Ð invariably defined as secular
and Western Ð and sectarianism another.
This secularist paradigm insists that reli-
gious feelings, beliefs, culture, and passions
are insidiously persistent and immutable.
Sectarianism, therefore, is almost always
identified as a problem affecting less devel-
oped countries, or those peripheral regions
of Europe such as the Balkans or Northern
Ireland. The destruction by Hindus of a
mosque in the late 20t h-century India is
often comprehended in light of a long histo-
ry of antagonism between Hindus and Mus-
lims in South Asia. The Maronite conflict
with Druzes in Lebanon is similarly under-
stood against the backdrop of an age-old
clash of civilizations in the eastern Mediter-
ranean. The power of such a paradigm is
rooted in a simple observation: that the dis-
course accompanying and justifying sectari-
an violence is itself expressed in a language
that leaves little room for historical nuance.
More often than not, this language evokes a
longue dure of antagonisms that mark Mus-
lims, Hindus, Jews, or Christians as irrecon-
cilably different, as inherently violent, and
as incorrigibly hostile to a particular groupÕs
collective identity. Moreover, such a reas-
suringly simple paradigm of age-old hostili-
ty is constantly reinforced by every act of vi-
olence that occurs between religious com-
munities in the modern world, regardless of
the specific historical context.
HistoriansÕ constructions of
s e c t a r i a n i s m
For many observers, the case of Lebanon
has bolstered the notion that sectarianism is
an age-old problem. Because the recent civil
war (which ostensibly ended in 1990) mim-
icked many of the aspects of an earlier 19t h-
century conflict between Druzes and Ma-
ronites that devastated the region in 1860,
Lebanon has been written about as if its re-
ligious antagonisms stemmed from ancient
grievances that would forever rob it of an
opportunity to ÔbecomeÕ modern. Book after
book, speech after speech, and article after
article have repeated this so often that few
bother to look to closely into the origins of
sectarianism in Lebanon. Most Lebanese
themselves are convinced that sectarianism
is endemic in Lebanese history. Prominent
Western historians have claimed that sectar-
ianism represents a Muslim reaction, indeed
a rage, against the modernization policies
advanced by the Ottoman reform move-
ment which declared the equality of Muslim
and non-Muslim and which began a whole-
sale administrative, cultural and military
transformation of the Ottoman Empire. The
polemical implication of this argument as-
sumes that the Muslim majority could not
be really modern Ð that is to say, Muslims
could never accept Jews or Christians as
equals, but had to be cajoled into a Western
and presumably alien modernity by author-
itarian regimes. Invariably the only evidence
presented to support this interpretation is
the testimony of contemporary European
sources or the fact of the violence itself as if
the outbreak of religious hostilities in 1860
in and of itself was sufficient to prove a the-
sis of age-old sectarianism. Other historians
have stressed social and economic pres-
sures and dislocations caused by the impact
of European industrialization on, and the
consequent decline of, the Syrian textile in-
dustry. And still other historians have
claimed that European rivalries played a de-
cisive role in fomenting sectarian divisions.
Historians, in short, have sought to explain
the secular context of sectarianism; few
have ever seriously grappled with sectarian-
ism itself except to treat it as an easily
grasped phenomenon, a cultural essence, a
tribal will, a primordial religiosity that is an-
tithetical to a liberal, egalitarian and secular
m o d e r n i t y .
Interpretation of Ottoman
r e f o r m
To the extent that sectarianism in modern
Lebanon is religious in articulation it is in-
deed antithetical to a Western-style secular-
ism which ostensibly separates religion
from politics. But to the extent that sectari-
anism emerged out of a 19t h-century inter-
section of Ottoman reformation and West-
ern intervention, it should not be classified
as antithetical to modernity. Before the
1860 massacres, social status, not religious
affiliation, defined politics in Mount Leba-
non. While in the Ottoman Empire as a
whole, and in urban areas in particular, Mus-
lims enjoyed political and cultural primacy
over non-Muslims, the operative social and
political distinction in rural Mount Lebanon
was between knowledgeable elites and ig-
norant commoners regardless of religious
affiliation. Both Christian and Druze reli-
gious authorities legitimized the traditional
secular political and social order. It was the
Europeans, who insisted on saving the Ôsub-
jugatedÕ Christians of the Orient, that sin-
gled out religion in Mount Lebanon as the
basis for, and sign of, modern reform. In the
m i d - 1 9t h century, European powers inter-
vened in the region on an explicitly sectari-
an basis. The French championed the Ma-
ronites and the British protected the Druzes.
In an effort to resist European encroach-
ment and to construct a notion of a secular-
ized Ottoman subject-citizen, the Ottomans
in Mount Lebanon guaranteed Muslim (and
Druze) and non-Muslim (Maronite) commu-
nities equal political representation and tax-
ation. At one level, the problem facing Euro-
pean powers, Ottoman authorities, and
local elites was how to transform religious
communities into political communities,
while also preserving a hierarchical social
order. On another level, communal politics
inadvertently democratized politics as non-
elites forced themselves to the forefront of
sectarian mobilizations which, in turn, often
violated traditional hierarchies. For exam-
ple, Maronite commoners interpreted Ot-
toman reform to mean social as well as reli-
gious equality, whereas the Maronite
church interpreted Ottoman reform to
mean a ÔrestorationÕ of an imagined Ma-
ronite Christian emirate in Mount Lebanon
(which had never existed as such). Both in-
terpretations of reform constituted visions
of liberation. Both either entirely excluded
or subordinated the Druze inhabitants of
Mount Lebanon. The religiously mixed na-
ture of the region and the growing interven-
tion of European powers who insisted on
partitioning Mount Lebanon into pure
Christian and Druze districts only exacerbat-
ed communal tensions.
Ultimately, it was conflicting interpreta-
tions over the meaning of Ottoman reform Ð
not age-old religious antagonisms Ð that led
directly to the sectarian violence in Mount
Lebanon in the 1840s and culminated in the
massacres of 1860. And it was an attempted
solution to this Ôage-oldÕ problem that led
Ottomans and Europeans to construct a sys-
tem of local administration and politics ex-
plicitly defined on a narrow communal
basis. Indeed the emergence of an explicitly
sectarian political practice in Mount
Lebanon can be dated precisely to the early
1840s. It was reinforced after 1860 when the
Ottoman government created the religious-
ly balanced Administrative Council to aid
the non-native Christian Ottoman governor
appointed by the Sublime Porte in consulta-
tion with the European powers. And it
reached its most complex and theoretically
sophisticated form in the modern Lebanese
state which divides power on a supposedly
proportional (hence theoretically equitable)
basis exclusively amongst the major reli-
gious communities of Lebanon.
To be clear, this is not to say that sectari-
anism is ÔgoodÕ because it is ÔmodernÕ. It is
not being suggested that sectarianism is the
only kind of modernity, as sectarian ideo-
logues would have it. Nor is it suggested
that sectarianism is an ideal system. Clearly
it is not: it is chronically unstable because
constant struggles between and within reli-
gious communities to define political con-
trol of, and the limits to, these communities
consistently overwhelm every attempt to
build a national platform. The articulation of
a broad, national, and secular Lebanese citi-
zenship will always be sacrificed on the altar
of narrower communal interests because it
was upon these communal interests that
the state was founded and it is these inter-
ests that continue to dominate the state.
Rather, while it is important to reject sectar-
ian history, which can interpret the past
only in light of supposedly unchanging
Muslim, Christian or Jewish communal iden-
tities, it is also important to realize that the
simplistic equation of sectarianism with
atavism indicates the poverty of secularist
imagination. It is also not adequate to un-
derstand sectarianism simply as a colonial
construction. In the case of Mount Lebanon,
sectarianism represented the transition
from a pre-colonial and pre-reform Ot-
toman history to a post-reform history dom-
inated by the West.
In the final analysis, what makes sectarian-
ism so tenacious in Lebanon today is that it
is a profoundly problematic component of
the modern nation: it represents conflicting
interpretations of a discourse of equality
which, because of a 19t h-century history that
brought together European ÔhumanitarianÕ
intervention, Ottoman reform and local as-
pirations, made the religious synonymous
with the communal, and the communal par-
allel to the individual. In the social context
of Mount Lebanon, sectarianism allowed
non-elites to involve themselves in politics
to an unprecedented degree precisely be-
cause politics was defined along communal
rather than exclusively elite lines. In the con-
text of the Ottoman Empire as a whole, and
against the backdrop of several hundred
years of Muslim rule over Christian minori-
ties, sectarianism represented no less a pro-
found change: the state no longer had a ma-
jority and several minorities defined in ex-
clusionary religious terms, but a series of in-
terdependent religious communities whose
members were granted equal social and po-
litical status before the law. That this sectar-
ian revolution was radically distorted by
French colonialism during the post-Ot-
toman era to favour the Maronites (which
ultimately led to two civil wars to redress
this imbalance) should not obscure its cru-
cial break with an Ottoman history that priv-
ileged Muslim over non-Muslim and elite
over commoner. Without recognizing the
historical, social and political complexity of
sectarianism, the secular criticism of it will
continue to be little more than indignant
sound and fury Ð as impotent as it is misdi-
rected. It will continue to miss the point, the
intensity and the persistence of sectarian al-
legiances and antipathies. Sectarianism is
not a disease but a modern reality that must
be understood before it can be dismantled.
R e c o n s t r u c t i n g
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